It is only with Heidegger that finitude returns to the center of the philosophical stage in full force and in a radicalized form. At issue in his Being and Time is a reconsideration of human receptivity and discursivity, no longer in the Kantian sense as structural limitations of the human cognitive capacity to know beings from a hypothetical absolute viewpoint but rather as fully positive conditions of the “understanding of being” (Seinsverständnis) that characterizes Dasein, the human being insofar as she constitutes the finite and dynamic “there” (Da) of sense and meaningfulness. By overcoming the Kantian gap between the in-itself and the phenomenal and the Neo-Kantian separation of ontology and epistemology, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is able to reappropriate critical philosophy as a preparatory groundwork for a new metaphysics—as a point of departure for a “fundamental ontology” whose “foundation” is nothing other than Dasein’s finitude. This finitude of Dasein is the inherently temporal structure of its existence, more precisely, the temporal dynamic that contextualizes Dasein’s understanding of being by situating all access to a meaningful present (Gegenwart) within an interplay of the intertwining dimensions of the future (Zukunft) and “having-been” (Gewesenheit), that is, of futural possibility—limited by death as the constant and ultimate possibility of impossibility—and already established facticity. This temporality or timeliness (Zeitlichkeit) of Dasein’s understanding of being correlates structurally with temporality (Temporalität) as the meaning-horizon of being itself, and this temporally articulated correlation between finite and contextual access to meaningfulness and finite and contextual givenness of meaningfulness is the core, the fundament, of fundamental ontology. As the later Heidegger emphatically points out, no metaphysics in the classical sense can be built upon such a radically de-absolutized and desubstantivized “foundation.” The temporal correlation between Dasein and being cannot be an absolute point of reference, in the literal sense of being “absolved” from all essential references and relations to anything other than itself. On the contrary, it is to be conceived as a dynamic event (Ereignis) of contextualization in which accessible, meaningful presence, the temporal present, is ceaselessly reconfigured in terms of temporal background dimensions.From: The End of the World after the End of Finitude : On a Recently Prominent Speculative Tone in Philosophy.
By entering the relation between human, language, and Be-ing, the thinker participates in the coming forth of Be-ing, rather than staying in the metaphysical representational function of language. Heidegger calls this enthinking, enowning, inceptual thinking. Kovacs seeks to enter this mode of thinking-saying-writing. According to Kovacs, the speaker here enters “the inner dynamics and the range of the saying, disclosing potential of language” and its “capacity to say the unsayable”. The key to this enterprise is the hermeneutic temporality of the human and language belonging “equally originarily” to Be-ing.
3:AM: Can we understand Heidegger’s metaphysics in relation to any of the analytic metaphysicians—or is he best understood in reaction to Husserl?
AM: I believe that there are deep connections between Heidegger’s metaphysics and the concerns of analytic metaphysicians. One of the things that I try to do in my book is to show that Heidegger’s metaphysics involved him in a kind of battle with language that was reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s early work. But that is just one example of very many. And it illustrates the point we touched on earlier: how profitable it can be to set non-analytic traditions alongside the analytic tradition.
That said, I also believe that it is crucial to understand Heidegger in relation to Husserl, and in particular to understand him as pursuing Husserl’s phenomenological project of “bracketing” our normal beliefs and focusing on their significance for us. There were important differences between them, to be sure, but I think that the differences—which were more a matter of doctrine than of basic methodology—were on the whole far less important than the similarities. I have a section in my book entitled “Heidegger as Phenomenologist, Pro Husserl and Contra Husserl”. One of my aims in that section is to combat a tendency among commentators to emphasize the “contra” at the expense of the “pro”.
Being notoriously relies for its essence on the existence of human beings; if Dasein were to cease to exist so too would Being itself insofar as the latter is the special preserve of the only entity for whom Being is an issue. Being is a relation, the prerogative of a self- interpreting, self-questioning human encounter with what appears.
The notion that oil might be phrased in the language of ontology is, then, utterly foreign to the project of Being and Time.
[P]erhaps the best way to approach Lacan is to ask a very simple, almost detective question. Lacan obviously knew Heidegger very well: why, then, did he stick to the notion of the subject? Why didn’t he drop subject? I mean, as the name for the core of – inhuman core of – human being? I think the reason is – and here, again, from a weird perspective I approach one of the big topics of Alain, where I agree with him – the relationship between language and truth. Where I support Alain fully is in his – the way I understand it – anti-hermeneutic trust of not identifying truth with – the one who developed this most radically was Heidegger, arguably – this idea that truth is ultimately the historically destined horizon of being which dwells – is inscribed- by our language.
In this historicized transcendental mode, a Heideggerian would have said, ‘this is the unsurpassable horizon of our access to truth.’ The ultimate- the furthest- you can go is to reflect on the horizon of how things appear to you, of how being is disclosed. For example, you can make – I don’t know how many speculative quantum physics discoveries, but – in order to pursue them you already have to have a certain historically destined – embodied in language – pre-understanding of being. So, all we can do, then, is to think – the event, not in the Alain’s sense, but as Heideggerian ereignis?, this totally abysmal game of new destinies of being- this totally abysmal game of evental occurrences of, modes of, disclosure is the ultimate horizon. So, in this sense, for Heidegger, language is the house of being. What lacan does here, basically, I think, is just to add something- a dimension missing in Heidegger (for Lacan). To put it in cynical terms, for Lacan, language is not just the house of being, it’s the torture house of being. We are basically tortured by language – that’s the topic of castration, distortion, and so on.
We are never at home in the house of being- it’s a traumatic discourse – and, again, the name of this discourse is jouissance. So, here I come to Alain; I don’t like Elfriede Jelinek- her style is too dirty for me- but she said something that I deeply agree with, a wonderful phrase; she said “language should be tortured to tell the truth”. I think that this would be the second counterpart: that we should drop all this hermeneutic trust into – you know, the access to truth is to open yourself to the message which is in language – no! We should torture language. And, I think, maybe we should even read poetry and art in this way: as different modes of torture.
What is poetry? It’s a great torture of language.The google voice transcriber did a great job on this one. My favorite is Katrine Malibu.
I started finding it problematic: firstly regarding everything as tool-being is an ontological statement and it ignores the technical-historical question, which makes OOO unable to answer the challenge of Heidegger in his 1953 lecture “The Question Concerning Technology”; secondly I developed an opposite reading of Heidegger from Harman, since he has to deny the relations of the Zuhandene in favour of his concept of withdraw, while for me it was the moment where a multiplicity of relation manifests and it was evident to me when we read Heidegger’s first division of Being and Time carefully and taking his project as a whole. Therefore, I would like to emphasize on the “existence” of digital objects, whose technical-historical question has been buried in the fascination with the general concept of objects, which are always only about chair, table, billiard or so. What I call digital objects are essentially data formalized by computational ontologies, and here the term ontology becomes intriguing again, so I wanted to reintroduce the concept of ontology into the understanding of digital objects in light of this coincidence.
On Mitchell’s reading, the danger lies in the one-sidedness that comes about through the forgetting of being as the medium of appearance (the world), so that “beying” shows itself only as positionality. However, humans stand in a more original relation to being, and can therefore never become standing reserve without remainder. In them, "a trace of the thing persists", and the fourfold is Heidegger’s attempt to recover this trace in the midst of positionality.This is one of the two must-read books on Heidegger this century.